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According to Hegel, the now is just what is not any longer when it 
is 2.  
By contrast with this expression of extreme instability, physics has 
inherited from Parmenides a very strong tendency towards the 
formulation of formal invariants, independent from any personal, 
spatial and temporal point of view. The very notion of state, which is 
so fundamental for physics, concentrates in it an ambition to convey 
the primacy of Being over the process of Change3. This quest of 
immutability culminated with Minkowski's geometry of space-time, 
and with Einstein's Parmenidean characterization of the flow of time 
as an illusion4.  Thus, at first sight, “now” is exactly the kind of term 
which is to be banished from the language of physics. One should not 
be surprised that “physics is missing any concept of the now”5. 
                                         
1 A few paragraphs of this paper were borrowed from my short preface to: M. Bitbol & E. Ruhnau 
(eds.), Now, Time and Quantum Mechanics, Editions Frontières, 1994 
2See G.W. F. Hegel, The phenomenology of mind, Trad. J.B. Baillie, Library of philosophy, 1931, 
Part A, chapter I. 
3E. Ruhnau, “The now, the missing link between matter and mind”, in: M. Bitbol & E. Ruhnau 
(eds.), Now, Time and Quantum Mechanics, Editions Frontières, 1994 
4K. Popper, The postscript to the Logic of scientific discovery, II The open universe, Hutchinson, 
1982, §26 
5 About the thema of the “missing now” see also: “The starting point of our enquiry is the 
‘missing now’ in physics” J. Schneider, “The now, relativity theory and quantum mechanics”; S. 
Saunders,  “Time and quantum mechanics in: M. Bitbol & E. Ruhnau (eds.), Now, Time and 
Quantum Mechanics,  op. cit. According to S. Saunders, for instance, “In both cases (quantum 
mechanics without state reduction and space-time theory without ‘time flow’), it seems that 
something fundamental is missing in the physics”; M. Bitbol, “The missing now”, Contextos 
(University of Leon, Spain), VI/11, 17-31, 1988 (new version published on Academia.edu : “IS 
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In fact, the lack of any concept of the now is only one instance of a 
momentous choice which underlies physics as a whole. This choice 
consists of banishing actual situations and indexical elements of 
speech from theoretical descriptions, in order to reach a universal 
formal construct relative to which actualities and indexical terms can 
be considered as reflecting mere particular standpoints. Physics could 
be defined, inter alia, as a systematic attempt at pushing actuality 
aside and bringing form to the fore. True, the formal descriptions 
which are the theoretical end-products of physics have to connect 
somewhere with actuality. But one should notice that even this 
connection is dealt with in such a way that any direct reference to 
actuality is avoided. Indeed, in physics, applying a general law to a 
particular case, namely connecting the theoretical description to the 
practice of the experimentalists, involves two steps which both 
carefully avoid strict adherence to actuality. First, one refers to 
mesoscopic individual objects, namely to preparative devices and 
measurement apparatuses that can be handled within the laboratory. 
Second, by ordering the individuatable events which may arise from 
experimental configurations, and by defining a metric on this ordered 
set, one generates a set of numbers taken to be the measured values of 
the variables which enter into a certain law. Now, mesoscopic 
individual objects and individuatable events are related to actuality, 
but only sketchily, by means of one of their aspects or profiles, at a 
certain time and in a certain perceptual context. As for the measured 
values, they retreat even farther from actuality; for they tend to 
substitute abstract locations on a numeric scale for actual events, just 
as stating a property P means substituting an abstract location on the 
logical binary scale [P, not-P] for an actual perception. 
To sum up, even though a physical formalism has to connect 
repeatedly with actuality, it usually does so through the mediation of 
the halfway concepts of object and event. Invariant structures are 
defined in such a way that they are not directly instanciated by actual 
perceptions, but rather by individual objects and particular processes 
involving changes in properties or in measured values. Physical laws 
connect only indirectly with actuality, usually by providing a mapping 
                                                                                                               
NOW A MOMENT IN TIME ? A discussion of McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time 
from a transcendental idealist standpoint”) 
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of a set of individual objects and measured values onto another set 
made of the same individuals and modified values6. 
The previous remarks can be understood as follows: physics 
articulates a second-level objectivation (the level of laws and 
structures); and at the same time, it presupposes a first-level 
objectivation which underlies language, everyday activity, and 
ordered experimental activity as well. The first-level objectivation 
amounts to defining tacitly (by acting and by using language) 
mesoscopic permanent objects (or ‘things’), enduring properties, and 
causal processes, of which singular actual percepts are supposed to be 
mere special appearances. This first-level is definitely out of the scope 
of physics, for the contents of physics could not even be stated 
without taking it for granted. We shall say that physical laws are 
related to actuality through the intermediary of pre-objectivized 
delegates of actuality (namely the individual ‘things’ and measured 
values).  
Such a shift from actuality to its delegates has recently been 
documented by Hintikka. According to Hintikka7, Kant’s theory of 
knowledge can only apply to modern science if one replaces passive 
sensorial reception with activities of seeking and finding, and also if 
one replaces the intuitive mode of selection of particulars, which was 
advocated by Kant8, with logical instantiation. But there is an 
important difference between intuition and logical instanciation, 
which bears on their respective relation to actuality. Kant’s intuition is 
directly connected to sensorial actuality. By contrast, logical 
instantiations are once again halfway between forms (or concepts) and 
actuality. Indeed, on the one hand, logical instanciations are 
‘particular representations of concepts’ according to Hintikka; and on 
the other hand we have seen that they are able to operate as delegates 
of actuality. 
We can understand this momentous difference of focus between 
Kant and modern advocates of transcendental philosophy as follows. 
Kant’s reference to intuition, and to conceptual organization of the 
material afforded by intuition, is typical of a situation where science is 
                                         
6 See Brian Cantwell Smith, On the origin of objects, The MIT press, 1996 
7 J. Hintikka & I. Kulas, The game of language, Reidel, 1983, p. 33; J. Hintikka, Knowledge and 
the Known, Reidel, 1974 
8 I. Kant, Critique of pure reason, (new edition, by V. Politis), Everyman's library, 1993, A32-
B47 
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so young that it needs some kind of (transcendental) foundation of the 
preliminary (first-level) objectivation of individuals, properties, and 
events, which it presupposes. By contrast, Hintikka’s focus on logic is 
typical of a situation where science is sufficiently mature; so much so 
that one may consider that the pre-objectivation of individuals and 
properties has been given enough intra-scientific justifications by its 
successful use in the past, especially in classical physics, to be in no 
need of further extra-scientific (metaphysical or transcendental) 
foundations. No wonder that Bohr relied on classical physics as a 
necessary ground of the elaboration of quantum physics. 
Now, this flight farther and farther from actuality, towards more 
and more universal hierarchies of forms, raises some problems. It is of 
course legitimate in so far as it is aimed at extending ever increasingly 
the scope of our inter-subjective discourse and our common mastery 
of every aspect of our environment. But exclusive fascination for the 
supposed target of the flight, to the detriment of the original actuality, 
may also have some serious drawbacks. I shall list some of them in 
this paper. To begin with, in paragraphs 2 and 3, I’ll discuss those 
drawbacks which concern physics itself. Then, in paragraphs 4 and 5, 
I shall give a hint about some other drawbacks which concern our 
civilization as a whole in so far as it takes physics as a cultural 
paradigm, and objectivation as a quasi-exclusive value. Finally, in a 
short conclusion, I shall draw the teachings of this rehabilitation of 
actuality for the general project of a formal epistemology. 
 
2-From the laws of physics to actuality I:  
Statistical mechanics 
 
The hypothetico-deductive method, which is so widespread in 
physics, has had a great impact on the philosophical conceptions of 
the physicists. It is essential to this method that precise predictions 
bearing on phenomena can generally be derived from both the 
formalism and the initial conditions, but not the other way around. As 
a consequence, it is very common among physicists to reify the 
formal skeleton of the model; namely to behave as if the model were a 
faithful (though possibly approximate) representation of some 
absolute reality, and as if the phenomena themselves were only partial 
and relative appearances involving both the represented “absolute” 
reality and our special mode of experimental investigation. The most 
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traditional way of expressing such a hierarchy between the model and 
the phenomena is the Descartes-Locke distinction between primary 
qualities (which belong to a geometrical representation) and 
secondary qualities (whose significance is relative to the receptive 
structures of our senses). Such a distinction is still popular today 
among physicists, provided one accepts to shift the focus of primary 
structures from the ordinary space to extended abstract spaces, and to 
replace the senses with experimental devices. 
Unfortunately, this conception is not devoid of difficulties. To 
begin with, one may wonder, in terms borrowed from Schrödinger9, 
whether the (hypothetico-deductive) method is based on the good 
reasons one has to think that a stable, unified and universal model will 
eventually be able to represent reality as such, or whether, conversely, 
this realist belief is based on the (provisional) success of the method. 
Another difficulty is that the more a formalism becomes autonomous, 
the more it incorporates symmetries which enable it to deal with a 
great variety of (experimental) situations, and the less it is able to deal 
with the essentially asymmetric features of particular situations 
without ad hoc assumptions. Two (possibly interrelated) instances10 of 
this loss of relevance to immediate experience are:  
(i) Statistical mechanics and its difficult connection with 
irreversibility, 
(ii) Quantum mechanics and its purely probabilistic connection 
between the continuous unitary evolution of state vectors and the 
discontinuity of experimental outcomes. 
Let us begin which statistical mechanics (quantum mechanics will 
be dealt with in §3). It has been accepted, since the debate between 
Boltzmann and Loschmidt, that any purely mechanical description of 
a system made of a great number of molecules is bound to be time-
symmetric and reversible. Gibbs’ method has made this point even 
clearer11. Therefore, in order to account for the second law of 
thermodynamics in mechanical terms, it appears to be necessary to 
impose some extrinsic rules, or approximations, which have the effect 
of breaking the formal time-symmetry. But such rules or 
                                         
9 E. Schrödinger, “The present situation of quantum mechanics” §1, in: J.A. Wheeler & W.H. 
Zurek, Quantum theory and measurement, Princeton University Press, 1983 
10 Another celebrated instance is the difficult connection between the Einstein-Minkowski four-
dimensional block-universe, the concept of ‘now’, and the past-future asymmetry. 
11 See e.g. E.T. Jaynes, “Gibbs versus Boltzmann entropies”, in: E.T. Jaynes, Papers on 
probability, statistics, and statistical physics, (R.D. Rosenkrantz, ed.), Reidel, 1983 
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approximations (for instance Gibbs’ coarse graining, Boltzmann’s 
assumption of molecular chaos in a probabilistic framework, Jaynes’ 
minimal information, or the comparison between the time of 
observation and the Poincaré’s cycle), clearly refer to the spatial or 
temporal scale of the experimenters. This latter point has either been 
taken as a proof that the second law has some irreducible “subjective” 
aspects in it, or as an incentive to go beyond the Boltzmann-Gibbs 
version of statistical mechanics in order to look for a purely 
“objective” account of the second law. In both cases one considers 
that, for a law to be “objective”, it should arise directly from the 
model, namely from the second-level of objectivation which is typical 
of physics, and not from our interest-relative way of dealing with our 
environment. The requirement is that the model must be capable of 
generating its own symmetry-breaking processes.  
Many attempts at reaching the “objectivity” of the second law of 
thermodynamics in this sense have been carried out. But when 
carefully studied, such attempts all exhibit the features they aimed at 
disparaging, though under highly elaborated aspects. One recent 
example is Prigogine’s theoretical description of how time-symmetry 
breaking occurs by means of what he himself calls the “laws of 
chaos”12. At first sight, the introduction of the high sensitivity to 
changes in initial conditions, which is typical of chaotic regimes, is all 
that was needed in order to show that the time-symmetry breaking of 
the dynamics of molecular systems is “intrinsic” (namely self-
generated by the formalism). However, as I. Stengers rightly pointed 
out13, Prigogine’s result does not so much demonstrate the possibility 
of deriving the second law of thermodynamics from a proper 
consideration of the traditional object(s) of statistical mechanics, as 
the necessity of considering a completely new kind of object. In the 
so-called baker’s transformation, for instance, fibers must be 
substituted for material points; for it is precisely this substitution 
which allows one to avoid any reference to coarse graining. Thus, in 
order for the model to generate its own symmetry-breaking process, 
one must modify the very mode of objectivation which yields it. 
                                         
12 I. Prigogine, From being to becoming, Freeman, 1980; I. Antoniou & I. Prigogine, “Intrinsic 
irreversibility and integrality of dynamics”, Physica, 192A p. 443, 1992; I. Prigogine, Les lois du 
chaos, Flammarion, 1994 
13 I. Stengers, Cosmopolitiques 5. Au nom de la flèche du temps: le défi de Prigogine, Editions La 
Découverte, 1997 
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Whereas the old mode of theoretical objectivation (which extrapolates 
the spontaneous mode of objectivation of our everyday speech and 
activity one step farther, namely from ‘things’ to ‘material bodies’ or 
‘material points’) had the consequence that some aspects of the 
phenomena were to be ascribed to the relation between the object and 
the experimenters, the new mode of objectivation incorporates the 
relational aspect14, and thus exempts the physicist from explicitly 
mentioning it. Accordingly, the leading question of the physicists no 
longer bears on the properties of an autonomous pre-given object of 
nature, but on how it is possible to frame a new type of object in such 
a way that it can be treated as if it were autonomous, and yet able to 
encompass the typical asymmetry of the situations with respect to 
which it has been provided this “as if” autonomy. 
This circumstance has been taken by I. Stengers as a proof that, 
nowadays, physicists are still able to fulfil their good old dream of a 
series of models construed as increasingly faithful representations of 
reality, in spite of the fact that they have inadvertently made clear the 
interest-relative components of their models by the very attempt of 
hiding them. However, from a critical viewpoint, the same 
circumstance can be seen in a very different light. In this perspective, 
Prigogine’s move shows how a great specialist of statistical 
thermodynamics is eventually forced to recognize, by his having 
recourse to a new kind of (purposedly constructed) hybrid objects, 
that he uses constitutive procedures (in Kant’s sense) during the initial 
phase of his work. True, the modern statistical physicist has rehearsed 
successfully the fascinating game of projection of the normative rules 
of experimental practices onto a model and a set of objects. But the 
new version of this projection is so thoroughly modified that it misses 
almost completely its original target. For the projected object now 
manifestly encompasses the “descriptional relativity”15 which was to 
be eliminated from the model. It has become obvious, from the very 
process of construction of the new object of statistical physics, that it 
cannot pretend to represent a reality construed in the absolute, 
irrespective of any relation with the particular experimental situations 
in which it manifests itself. 
                                         
14 ibid. p. 150 
15 See M. Mugur-Schächter, “From quantum mechanics to universal structures of 
conceptualization and feedback on quantum mechanics”, Foundations of physics, 23, 37-122, 
1993 
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No wonder that another lineage of physicists and philosophers of 
physics16 have tried to reverse completely the problem. I. Stengers 
herself accepts, at least in principle, the appropriateness of this kind of 
reversal, which gives priority to the asymmetric presuppositions of the 
experimental practices over the internal symmetries of the model. As 
she notices, “(...) the well-known physical laws which assert the 
equivalence between ‘before’ and ‘after’ have been made possible by 
measurement operations; (but) the least measurement apparatus denies 
this equivalence”17.  However, as a philosopher of science, she does 
not wish to hold on to that simple remark. According to her, this 
would make difficult any communication between philosophers and 
physicists, since the latter are traditionally more fascinated by their 
intentionally aimed at objects and models, than by their own practices. 
I personally think that, on this point, her attitude is exceedingly 
ambiguous. Being respectful of the internal aims and historical 
choices of the community of physicists should not prevent a 
philosopher from throwing strong light on the background which 
underlies their experimental activity, and from insisting that this 
background cannot be completely wiped out from the theoretical end-
product of their investigation without major inconvenients. After all, 
some physicists are not unable to understand what is at stake in the 
critical approach of their science, and this may provide their practice 
with additional self-consciousness. One should not forget that even 
though the usefulness of philosophical lucidity is admittedly doubtful 
during the periods of ‘normal science’, it has proved crucial during 
the past major scientific revolutions.  
So, let us turn to the arguments of those thinkers who advocated an 
equivalent of Kant’s “Copernican revolution” in the domain of 
statistical physics. To begin with, according to Bohr, the concept of 
observation already implies a fundamental irreversibility. In 
thermodynamics, the reason for this is quite obvious: “(...) the very 
concept of temperature stands in an exclusive relation to a detailed 
description of the behaviour of the atoms in the bodies concerned”18. 
                                         
16 N. Bohr, “Chemistry and the theory of atomic constitution”, Journal of the chemical society, 
349-384, 1932, in: N. Bohr, Collected Work, vol. 6, J. Kalckar (ed.), North-Holland, 1985; Th. 
Görnitz, E. Ruhnau, and C.F. v. Weizsäcker, “Temporal asymmetry as precondition of 
experience”, Int. J. Theor. Phys., 31, 37-46, 1992; M. Bitbol, “Prélude à l'irréversibilité”, Sciences 
et avenir (Numéro spécial Les énigmes du temps),  Mars 1994. 
17 I. Stengers, Cosmopolitiques 1. La guerre des sciences, Editions La Découverte, 1996, p. 107 
18 N. Bohr, Collected Work, vol. 6, op. cit. p. 400 
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In other terms, the operational definition of the temperature variable 
and the mechanical description of microscopic behaviour are 
“complementary”. It is this extrinsic (though fundamental) 
methodological point, rather than any intrinsic feature of the 
mechanical model which, says Bohr, “(...) allows us to solve the 
apparent contradiction between the law of increase of entropy and the 
general reversibility of the individual mechanical processes”19. In the 
same way, Görnitz, Ruhnau and Von Weizsäcker20 recently 
emphasized that temporal asymmetry is already at work in a very 
basic presupposition of experimental science construed as a process of 
information gathering: namely the pre-requisite of a difference 
between possibility and fact. Their problem is thus to explain the 
time-symmetry of the fundamental laws of physics given the time-
asymmetry which is the precondition of experience, and not to explain 
the time asymmetry of the most familiar processes by taking the time-
symmetry of the laws for granted. According to them, one possible 
answer is that this artificial time-symmetry is due to an abstraction 
leading one to transform semi-groups into groups whenever (i) clock-
time is represented by a real-valued continuum and (ii) laws of motion 
are formulated by means of differential equations.  
Of course, one may then wonder why symmetric laws such as that 
of mechanics are not flatly falsified by experiments which are 
supposed to involve an all-pervasive asymmetry. I think that the 
reason of this absence of straightforward falsification is that no 
experiment is ever compared directly to symmetric laws. Actually, 
experiments are compared to altered symmetric laws, namely to 
symmetric laws implicitly modified by an additional ad hoc 
asymmetric assumption. They are compared to the laws of mechanics 
modified by the hypothesis that motion takes place from earlier times 
to later times, or to the laws of electromagnetism modified by the 
selection of retarded solutions, or to the laws of relativity modified by 
an extrinsic distinction between the future cone of light and the past 
cone, and so on and so forth. It is in this way that, in the everyday 
work of physicists since the seventeenth century, the urge for 
universality and symmetry has been made compatible for all practical 
purposes with the fundamental asymmetry of experience. 
                                         
19 ibid. 
20 Th. Görnitz, E. Ruhnau, and C.F. v. Weizsäcker, “Temporal asymmetry as precondition of 
experience”, loc. cit. 
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Let me add at this point a little qualification of what I have written 
in the previous paragraphs. By advocating the logical priority of the 
actuality over the formalism, of the asymmetric presuppositions of the 
experimental work over the symmetric form of the laws, I do not wish 
to deny the value of the work of those physicists, such as Prigogine 
and many others21, who attempted to show how symmetry-breaking 
can be generated by the model itself provided some additional 
assumptions are made or some new choice of objects is performed. 
But I take this value to be quite different from what was usually 
indicated by the physicists themselves. Demonstrating the possibility 
for a model to generate its own symmetry-breaking does not mean 
that one has eventually disclosed the way an essentially symmetric 
reality manifests itself by asymmetrical appearances. It only means 
that physics is mature enough to be able to provide in its own terms a 
proof of self-consistency of the overall list of basic assumptions on 
which it relies. The axioms of the theory, which tend to reach 
maximal objectivity by means of generalized symmetry, and the 
asymmetric presuppositions of experimental practices, are thus shown 
to be mutually compatible. To paraphrase Quine22, the crucial point is 
that the physicist is not confronting a challenge from some external 
reality whose basic symmetry is to be connected with the obvious 
asymmetry of experience. He is confronting a challenge that arises 
from within his science. This challenge runs as follows: if the models 
of theoretical physics were to be taken litterally, how could we make 
sense of the practice of experimentation? The problem of the physicist 
is that of finding ways, in keeping with his models, whereby human 
beings (and especially experimenters) can live in an asymmetric 
environment. To summarize, it is a problem of logical closure of 
science, not of ontology. 
 
2-From the laws of physics to actuality II:  
Quantum mechanics 
 
In quantum mechanics, the issue of a connection between the 
formalism and actuality is even more stringent than in statistical 
mechanics. For, in this case, what is apparently missing in the model 
                                         
21 H. D. Zeh, The physical basis of the direction of time, Springer-Verlag, 1989; R.D. Sachs, The 
physics of time-reversal, The University of Chicago Press, 1987 
22 W.V. Quine, The roots of reference, Open court, 1974, p. 2 
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is not only an isolated feature of actuality, such as the asymmetry 
between fact and expectation, but it is a proper equivalent of actuality 
itself in its univocity. Accordingly, the most pervasive problem of the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics is that of “actualization” (or 
“transition to actuality”): namely that of the compatibility between (i) 
the continuous evolution of a state vector construed as a description of 
the manifold potentialities of some experimental situation involving a 
putative microscopic object, and (ii) the very circumstance that a 
single outcome is actually obtained at the end of the experiment. The 
first move in order to cope with this problem of compatibility has 
been to project the uniqueness of the outcome onto the formalism by a 
fiat, that is by means of Von Neumann’s projection postulate. But 
many questions then remain to be answered: the questions about 
where, when and how the so-called “reduction of the wave packet” 
occurs.  
In fact, things are even more intricate (and more interesting) than 
what this short presentation of the problem tends to show. Indeed, one 
additional distinctive feature of quantum mechanics is that its 
formalism puts the concept of pre-objectivized delegates of actuality, 
such as individual objects endowed with properties, or objective 
events, under strong pressure. Individuality lacks criteria within the 
quantum paradigm, and it must be bracketed in quantum (Bose-
Einstein or Fermi-Dirac) statistics; furthermore, intrinsic properties 
are generally23 replaced by contextual observables. As a consequence, 
the very notion of mutually exclusive past objective events, which is 
grounded on the idea that previous properties of objects have been 
permanently modified in a well-defined way, does not possess any 
formal equivalent within the framework of the quantum theories (if 
we put aside the artificial projection postulate). In B. d’Espagnat’s 
terms, “within standard quantum mechanics, (there are) no ‘really  
existing’ facts”24.  
Not surprisingly, in view of this two-step analysis, the proposed 
solutions to the so-called measurement problem of quantum 
mechanics essentially fall under two categories25. There are solutions 
                                         
23 The case of superselective observables must be taken apart. 
24 B. d’Espagnat, “Towards an empirical separable reality?”, Foundations of physics, 20, 1147-
1172 
25 I shall not discuss here the Hidden variable theories. Indeed, they do not offer any solution to 
the well circumscribed problem of the connection between the quantum formalism as it stands and 
actuality: they rather substitute a new formalism for the quantum formalism. 
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which tend to cross directly the gap between the quantum formalism 
and each unique actual event. And there are other solutions which 
only aim at showing how the notion of pre-objectivized delegates of 
actuality (the ‘properties’ and the ‘objective events’) can be recovered 
at the macroscopic scale. 
The first kind of solution consists in modifying pure unitary 
quantum mechanics in such a way that it acquires its own mechanism 
of transition, from a state vector to one eigenstate of the relevant 
observable. This approach, which consists in adding to the 
Schrödinger equation a small term of random discontinuous jump 
which adds up when macroscopic bodies are involved, has been 
initially developped by Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber26, and it has then 
been advocated by John Bell27. It perfectly fits the general 
requirement that a model should be able to generate its own processes 
of symmetry-breaking, since the symmetry of a state vector written in 
terms of a linear superposition of eigenstates is broken so that only 
one eigenstate remains. But it also has many defects. One defect is 
that the term added to the usual Schrödinger equation is completely ad 
hoc, and that several physicists are now at great pains to provide it 
with convincing justifications. A second defect28 is that one does not 
see how it is possible to account in this framework for the case of 
macroscopic superpositions (instantiated by superfluidity or 
superconductivity). A third defect is that one may wonder why and 
how a certain basis of eigenstates should be priviledged for the 
spontaneous collapse. This is the well-known “preferred basis 
problem” which is common to all the interpretations of quantum 
mechanics which tend to provide the Hilbert-space model with a 
sufficient autonomy29. Solving that problem by just mentioning that 
the choice of a basis may depend on some extrinsic criterion (such as 
the correspondence principle) would be tantamount to giving up the 
project of identifying a completely intrinsic mechanism of symmetry-
breaking in the quantum-mechanical model. 
                                         
26 G.C. Ghirardi, A. Rimini, & T. Weber, “Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic 
systems”, Physical review, D34, 470-491, 1986 
27 J.S. Bell, Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics, Cambridge University Press, 
1987, p. 202 
28 P. Mittelstaedt, The interpretation of quantum mechanics and the measurement process, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997 
29 M. Dickson, “What is preferred about the preferred basis?”, Foundations of Physics 25, 423-
440, 1995 
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But this is not all. A much more fundamental criticism which can 
be directed against the spontaneous collapse interpretation is that it is 
flatly irrelevant; that it aims at solving within the framework of 
physics a problem which is in principle out of the scope of physics 
(and of science in general), namely the problem of the uniqueness of 
actuality. As R. Omnès wrote, “(...) the actuality of facts is something 
that needs not be explained by a theory”30. Accordingly, the aim of a 
good theory of quantum measurements is not to account in each case 
for a transition from a state vector representing potentialities to one 
particular eigenstate representing the actual actuality; it is only to 
show how the quantum model may be made compatible with the very 
idea that a measurement process leads to one or another well-defined 
outcome, embodied in permanent properties of pointers and recorders. 
In other terms, the project here is to show how one may recover the 
general notion of pre-objectivized delegates of actuality within the 
quantum paradigm. The most efficient strategy which has been 
followed in order to do so can be described in two steps. The first step 
consists in encompassing not only the measurement apparatus, but 
also an environment with a great (possibly infinite) number of degrees 
of freedom, within the account of the measurement process by pure 
unitary quantum mechanics. The second step is to show that the 
interference terms of the corresponding density matrix tend to decay 
very fastly, so that one witnesses a transition from a pure state to an 
approximate statistical mixture of mutually exclusive alternatives. In 
other terms, one shows that there is a transition from the ‘and’ of a 
superposition to the ‘or’ of a mixture. This is the essential claim of the 
decoherence theories. Another, more recent, claim of the decoherence 
theories is that they can also account somehow for the choice of a 
basis of eigenstates31.  
The main difference between spontaneous collapse and 
decoherence can now be seen very clearly. One cannot say that they 
both perform the same job, though in two different ways. They rather 
arise from two radically different conceptions of the job to be 
performed. In the spontaneous collapse strategy, a mechanism of 
symmetry breaking is offered. But in the decoherence strategy, what 
is asked to the model is not to break its internal symmetries by its own 
                                         
30 R. Omnès, The interpretation of quantum mechanics, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 354 
31 J.P. Paz & W.H. Zurek, “Environment-induced decoherence, classicality, and consistency of 
quantum histories”, Physical Review, D48, 2728-2737, 1993 
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means, but only to have the capacity of transforming those 
symmetries in such a way that they offer a natural point of contact 
with an asymmetric well-defined actuality. This natural point of 
contact is the notion of mutually exclusive events. The necessity of 
reaching such an intermediate step between the probabilistic model 
and actuality is typical of quantum mechanics; it has no equivalent in 
classical physics. Indeed, the said intermediate step is straightaway 
available in classical stochastic theories, but not in quantum 
mechanics. 
All the problems are not solved at this stage, however. Decoherence 
theories, which claim to be able to make the Hilbert-space model 
generate a transition from ‘and’ (superpositions) to ‘or’ (mixtures) by 
their own means, are also pervaded by interest-relative (or 
anthropomorphic) postulates32. They all involve some statements or 
assumptions which presuppose that the processes described by the 
model must eventually result in an acceptable macroscopic world for 
anthropoid creatures to speak about and to live in. The most important 
among these statements is Zurek’s basic hypothesis that the overall 
state vector can be analyzed into three parts: one part for the object, 
one for the apparatus, and one for the environment. But admittedly, 
this partitioning only makes sense relative to a cognitive and 
experimental process involving mesoscopic instruments. In the same 
way, Gell-mann’s theory of decoherent histories involves a 
superimposed coarse graining of the set of consistent histories33; and 
this coarse-graining is clearly relative to the characteristics of the so-
called IGUSes (“Information Gathering and Utilizing Systems”), 
whose anthropomorphic flavour is unmistakable. This being granted, 
it is clear that, except in the remote perspective of a completely 
convincing strategy of “closing the epistemological circle”34 of object 
and subject within the framework of the Hilbert-space model, the 
decoherence theories cannot pretend to have made this model able to 
generate a disjunctive structure by its own means. They has not 
                                         
32 S. Saunders, “Decoherence, relative states, and evolutionary adaptation”, Foundations of 
physics, 23, 1553-1585, 1993; S. Saunders, “Time and quantum mechanics”, in: M. Bitbol & E. 
Ruhnau, Now, time and quantum mechanics, Editions Frontièreres, 1994; B. d’Espagnat, 
“Towards an empirical separable reality?”, loc. cit. 
33 Gell-Mann & J.B. Hartle, “Classical equations for quantum systems”, Physical Review, D47, 
3345-3382, 1993 
34A. Shimony, Search for a naturalistic world view, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 1993; see 
also Gell-Mann's IGUS concept, in: M. Gell-Mann & J.B. Hartle (1993), “Classical equations for 
quantum systems”, Physical Review, D47, 3345-3382 
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succeeded to show convincingly how a classical world may emerge by 
itself out of a completely self-sufficient Hilbert-space world. 
In view of this partial failure of the attempts at making the model 
able to self-generate structures which are isomorphic enough with 
actuality, one may be tempted by a renewed gesture of reversal of the 
problem. After all, if one transposes I. Stengers previous remarks 
from statistical mechanics to quantum mechanics, one lends into the 
following statement: the (unitary quantum-mechanical) model which 
yields statements such as the cat’s paradox  has been made possible 
by measurements; but the least single outcome of a measurement 
process flatly denies that the measurement chain is not in a well-
defined state. 
Giving a logical priority to phenomena over the Hilbert-space 
model was the attitude Bohr recommended in the interpretation of 
quantum mechanics: “Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism 
of quantum mechanics and electrodynamics merely offers rules of 
calculation for the deduction of expectations about observations 
obtained under well-defined experimental conditions specified by 
classical concepts”35. According to Bohr, the measurement problem 
thus arises from two essential mistakes. The first one bears on the 
status of the Hilbert-space model which is usually taken at face-value 
by physicists as describing “states” of “systems”, whereas it only 
represents a purely mathematical tool for calculating “expectations” 
(namely probabilities) in an overall experimental situation. The 
second one is that, in the quantum theory of measurement, we 
improperly “(...) treat the instrument as an object”36 to which a 
quantum “state” is ascribed. But one should not forget that, according 
to Bohr, instruments must be left in the (classical) background, rather 
than treated as (quantum) objects; for the instrument must fall under 
classical concepts in order that unambiguous communication between 
experimenters be possible at all. This is a kind of transcendental 
condition for experimental knowledge, and it cannot thus be ignored. 
Such a position is well-known, but it was soon discarded by physicists 
who hoped that the quantum theory of measurement would be able to 
self-generate its own classical level. When decoherence theories were 
formulated, Bohr’s position appeared all the more superseded since 
                                         
35 N. Bohr, Essays 1958-1962 on atomic physics and human knowledge, Ox Bow Press, 1987, p. 
60 
36 D. Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s philosophy of physics, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 113 
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the hoped-for result seemed close at hand. However, the conceptual 
loopholes of the decoherence theories (or rather the discrepancies 
between their ambitious aims and their methods) led to a recent 
renewal of Bohr-like arguments.  
One very striking example is M. Mugur-Schächter37, who both 
emphasizes that “In a probabilistic interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, there is no measurement problem”, and that “the quantum 
mode of description presupposes the instrument as a primary non-
represented given”.   
Another interesting example is S. Saunders, who started with an 
examination of Everett’s interpretation, who then put this 
interpretation in the light of the decoherence theories, and who finally 
recognized his affinities with a very sober statement of Bohr’s views. 
Let us try to understand these three successive moves, in the 
framework of the present study.  
(1) In the decoherence strategies, one tries to make the model 
compatible with the idea that some event has occurred an sich, but 
that we do not know which one; then one considers that the “actual 
actuality” just reveals which objective process, leading to a certain 
event, was taking place. In other terms, the decoherence theory aims 
at displaying a formal equivalent of a list of alternative pre-
objectivized delegates of actuality (the ‘events’).  
(2) But is such an attempt at showing how the intermediate-level 
concept of delegate of actuality may be made compatible with the 
Hilbert-space model, really indispensible? After all, one can perfectly 
dispense with this concept of delegate of actuality, provided one 
accepts to deal directly with the connection between the formalism 
and actuality. This is exactly what Everett attempted to do by means 
of his “relative state” interpretation of quantum mechanics (which has 
to be carefully distinguished from later many-worlds interpretations). 
In the “relative state” interpretation, the connection between actuality 
and the various possible experimental outcomes exhibited by the 
formalism is direct and purely indexical, in the same way as the 
connection between now and a set of tensed proposition. As S. 
Saunders writes,  “Whilst ‘Event E is past; Event E is future’ are 
prima facie contradictory, introducing new events T, T* we obtain: ‘E 
                                         
37 M. Mugur-Schächter, “Mécanique quantique, réel, et sens”, in: M. Bitbol & S. Laugier, (eds.), 
Physique et réalité, un débat avec Bernard d’Espagnat, 1997, Frontières-Diderot, p. 138 and 150. 
An english version of this paper is to be published by Foundations of physics.  
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is past relative to T; E is future relative to T*’ and there is no longer a 
difficulty. Likewise: ‘Observable X has value r; Observable X has 
value r*’ are inconsistent. But introducing a new observable Y we 
may say instead: ‘X has r relative to u of Y; X has r* relative to v of 
Y’ and there is no longer a contradiction”38. Thus, if one does not try 
to reconstitute the distance between actuality and objectified 
(absolutized) processes or events too rapidly, one may have the 
chance to realize that quantum mechanics has the structure of two-
level relativized description. The first level is well-known: each set of 
observable values is relative to some given type of apparatus. The 
second-level is typical of the indexical reading of Everett’s 
interpretation: each single value ascription for an observable is 
relative to a value ascription of another (apparatus) observable. In this 
scheme where no actual object or event is defined in the absolute, 
actuality can only arises relatively, for somebody who partakes of the 
chain of relations. But, this being accepted, shouldn’t we adopt 
directly our own standpoint, namely the standpoint of someone who is 
caught into the network of relations supposedly constitutive of the 
world? Does it make sense for us to assert (from a position in “cosmic 
exile”, so to speak) that our standpoint within the network of relation 
is “only” a local standpoint? 
(3) S. Saunders, as some other philosophers, takes the latter 
remarks very seriously into account.  So seriously that, at the end of 
his highly non-bohrian itinerary of thought, he fully recognizes the 
value of Bohr’s (strictly anthropocentric and local) approach of the 
measurement problem: “What is the solution of the measurement 
problem? I say it is this: on measurement of X with eigenstates φ1 
outcome x1 is observed with probability |<ψ|φ1>|2, where ψ is the initial 
state. This is what we return to, so it will do for a beginning as well”39. 
At this point, the “copernican revolution” of our appraisal of the 
measurement problem has been completed: the unicity of each 
experimental result comes first, and the probabilistic formalism of 
quantum mechanics is subordinated to it.  
Of course, here as in the case of statistical mecanics, we must add 
an important qualification to what has just been said. Advocating the 
                                         
38S. Saunders, “Time and quantum mechanics”, in: M. Bitbol & E. Ruhnau, Now, time and 
quantum mechanics, op. cit.  
39 S. Saunders, “Time and quantum mechanics”, in: M. Bitbol & E. Ruhnau, Now, time and 
quantum mechanics, op. cit. 
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logical priority of actuality over formalism, of the fundamental 
presuppositions of any cognitive process over the form of the model, 
does not mean denying the value of the work of the specialists (of 
decoherence) who attempted to show how the model may generate by 
itself the structure of objectivized delegates of actuality which any 
experimental work takes for granted. But this value is quite at 
variance from what is usually indicated by the physicists. 
Demonstrating the possibility for the Hilbert-space model to generate 
its own structure of mutually exclusive events does not mean that one 
has eventually disclosed how an essentially wave-like interferring 
reality may have emergent classical features. It only means that 
quantum mechanics is mature enough to be able to provide in its own 
terms a proof of consistency of the overall list of basic assumptions on 
which both its formalism and the experimental procedures used to test 
it, are based40. Here, as in the case of statistical mechanics, we are 
confronted with a problem of logical closure, not of ontology. The 
ontological problem would only arise if the Hilbert-space model were 
taken at face value, the state vectors being either considered as the 
basic constituants of the world or as expressing intrinsic 
determinations of the basic constituants of the world. By contrast, the 
problem of logical closure arises even if we consider the Hilbert-
space formalism together with, say, the Born rule, as a mere 
instrument of generalized probability assessment.  
Indeed, the problem of this instrument of probability assessment is 
that on the one hand it claims to be able to afford probabilistic 
valuations for any univocally defined experimental phenomenon, and 
that on the other hand, whenever it is extended to second-order 
experiments (measurements bearing on the first-order measuring 
instruments) it becomes prima facie incompatible with the simple 
statement that the first-order instrument has recorded a univocally 
defined phenomenon that we may happen to ignore. In other terms, if 
applied universally, this generalized probability theory appears to 
leave no room for the elementary notion of pre-objectivized delegate 
of actuality (the ‘event’ or the ‘property of a pointer’) which it itself 
presupposes. Decoherence shows that, actually, the Hilbert-space-
Born’s-rule mode of estimating probabilities can be made 
                                         
40 M. Bitbol, Mécanique quantique, une introduction philosophique, Flammarion, 1996; M. 
Bitbol, Schrödinger’s philosophy of quantum mechanics, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, Kluwer, 1996 
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approximately compatible with the presuppositions of 
experimentation. Provided decoherence theories are given this very 
restricted significance, the interest-relative assumptions which are 
indispensible to them in order to be worked out are no longer 
embarassing. For in this case, one only needs to show that the interest-
relative assumptions which are injected at one end are not necessarily 
inconsistent, given the model, with the interest-relative 
presuppositions which are to be respected at the other end. In more 
precise terms, one only needs to demonstrate (and one has indeed 
demonstrated by means of the decoherence theories) that when 
applied to a preliminary anthropocentered division of the world into 
objects, apparatuses, IGUSes, and environment, the quantum 
probability theory is not unable to give us back the mutually exclusive 
event-structure which human experimenters need to posit as a basic 
methodological assumption. 
 
4-Beyond physics:  
Form and actuality in life and philosophy 
 
What is at stake in this problem of the relations between form and 
actuality goes well beyond the respective status of the postulates of 
theoretical physics and the presuppositions of experimental practice. It 
is also a basic issue for the Western culture, and especially for its 
ability at circumventing the blind spot which was generated by its 
characteristic tendency to emphasize the exclusive value of 
objectivity. 
The priority given to the formal model over actuality had both a 
minor  consequence and a major consequence in the basic attitudes of 
the West. The minor consequence is what I shall call the Golem 
complex. Namely the mixture of hope and fear that, in the end, the 
creature of man will exceed the power of its creator. A purely 
intellectual variety of the Golem complex is the tacit conviction that 
theoreticians somehow think in order to avoid thinking any longer 41. 
Indeed, among other things, the use of mathematics is aimed at 
replacing the adventurous manipulation of fluctuating concepts by 
fixed definitions and mechanized derivations. This being granted, the 
hope and fear is that the mathematics ‘knows more than the 
                                         
41 M. Richir, La crise du sens et la phénoménologie, Jérôme Millon, 1990 
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theoretician’, and that it thus acquires a kind of autonomy with respect 
to the intellectual power of the scientist. Of course, at the present 
stage of science this situation is met only within the restricted domain 
of validity of some theories of physics. It is still necessary to think 
and to mould concepts near the margins of this domain, when the 
issue of the relation of one theory with another one (or with its 
successor) is at stake. But the very urge towards unification, the very 
dream of a ‘theory of everything’ which be the ‘final theory’ at the 
same time, shows that many of us consider that this is a provisional 
situation, which should ideally be replaced by one in which the theory 
is absolutely universal, self-sufficient, and thus able to dispense 
anyone from the obligation of further thinking. It is interesting to 
notice that this software variety of the Golem complex is strongly 
coupled with a hardware version, that we may call ‘the Deep Blue 
complex’. Here, it is the autonomy of a material embodyment of our 
cognitive operations which is both hoped-for and feared. The sought 
result of this process consists in reaching a mastery of the mental 
aspects of ‘all that is the case’42 in the same terms as the physical 
aspects, and thus, finally, obtaining a complete ‘closure of the 
epistemic circle’ (including actual appearances), within the 
methodological framework of the physical sciences. If, moreover, 
computers that work out some sort of ‘theory of everything’ by 
themselves could be conceived, the merging of the software and 
hardware variety of the Golem complex would be close at hand.  
Of course, this ambitious program could well prove to be an utopia, 
as a matter of principle. Let us then discuss this possibility. Many 
thinkers, the most prominent of whom are Gödel43, Lucas44 and 
Penrose45, have provided some reasonings tending to show that 
complete closure of the epistemic circle by means of a mechanistic 
model (or, more generally, within the framework of a computable 
physics) is impossible. All these arguments rely heavily on self-
reference and related incompleness theorems. According to R. 
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Penrose, for instance, “Gödel’s theorem has the clear implication that 
mathematical understanding [and other kinds of human understanding 
as well] cannot be reduced to a set of known and fully believed 
computational rules”46. As for Lucas’ classical argument, it runs thus: 
“We (...) construct a Gödelian formula (such as ‘this formula is 
unprovable in the system’) in [a given] formal system. This formula 
cannot be proved-in-the-system. Therefore, the machine cannot 
produce the corresponding formula as being true. But we can see that 
the Gödelian formula is true: any rational being could follow Gödel's 
argument and convince himself that the Gödelian formula, although 
unprovable in the given-system, was nonetheless - in fact for this very 
reason - true.”47. Let us examine carefully the implications of these 
sentences. What the “mind” is supposed to do in order to see that the 
Gödelian sentence of the machine is true, is to formulate a meta-
description of the relationship between the machine and its Gödelian 
sentence. But, after all, one may notice that this can be done by a 
second-order machine as well. Lucas therefore demonstrates that 
introducing higher-order machines does not help solving the difficulty 
in a purely mechanistical way, since this only leads to an infinite 
regress (the second order machine generates a Godelian formula 
referring to its own formal system, etc...). Why is it then that the mind 
is not confronted with the same difficulty as any higher order 
machine? Lucas’ answer is the following: “We are trying to produce a 
model of mind which is mechanical - which is essentially ‘dead’. - 
But the mind, being in fact ‘alive’ can always go one step better than 
any formal, ossified, dead system can”. Leaving aside the purely 
biological aspects of “life”, one can reformulate this remark as Gödel 
himself did in his own argument against a mechanical model of mind: 
“(...)mind, in its use, is not static, but constantly developing”48. Mind 
is no well-defined higher order procedure; it is the ability to produce 
an arbitrarily high order reasoning, ever adapted to the stage reached 
by the problem at stake. In more general terms, avoiding a too narrow 
focus on minds and machines, one might say that what Gödel and 
Lucas are trying to convey in their reasonings, is that actuality gets 
always ahead of any attempt at encompassing its features within a 
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formal model. Their reasoning thus challenges the software variety of 
the ‘Golem complex’, just as much as the hardware variety. 
Now, what are we to think of this family of arguments? At first 
sight, they are quite convincing. But many sound counter-arguments 
have also been provided, for instance by P. Benacerraf49 and J.C. 
Webb50. One of these counter-arguments is especially striking, 
because it uses the very existence of the argument against it. Let us 
quote J.C. Webb: “Such is the basic dilemma confronting anti-
mechanism: just when the constructions used in its arguments become 
effective enough to be sure of, (...) a machine can simulate them. In 
particular, it implies that our very behavior of applying Gödel’s 
argument to arbitrary machines - in order to conclude that we cannot 
be modelled by a machine - can indeed be modelled by a machine. 
Hence any such conclusion must fail, or else we will have to conclude 
that certain machines cannot be modelled by any machine! In short, 
anti-mechanist arguments must either be ineffective, or else unable to 
show that their executor is not a machine”51. This is perfectly right, 
but what does it show exactly? If taken at face value, it shows that any 
effective argument, be it an argument trying to appropriate ‘life’ or 
‘constant development’, can be simulated by a machine. More 
generally, arguments which attempt to involve directly or indirectly 
actuality, at one step or another of their development, are somehow 
self-defeating. This is so because they pathetically tend to capture 
“what makes itself manifest” within the field of “logic” in the sense of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.  
The consequence of these remarks is that the Gödel-Lucas family 
of arguments are invalid. Their invalidity however does not entail that 
they are useless. It only shows that they must be restricted to the 
status of a Tractarian “ladder” which has to be thrown away after one 
has climbed on it. Admittedly, part of the present article has itself this 
kind of status. But this should not be taken as a symptom of failure 
either. Only as a sign that whenever one tries to display the flaws of 
mechanistic or formalist positions by accepting the rules of the 
mechanist-formalist language-game, the well-foundedness of the 
whole move is undermined. Moreover, this kind of defect is not 
strictly specific of the criticism of mechanism and formalism. To be 
                                         
49 P. Benacerraf, “God, the devil, and Gödel”, Monist, 60, 9-33, 1967 
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fair, one should also notice that those mechanist-formalist reasonings 
which go against the choice of giving actuality a priority over formal 
models are undermined for converse reasons. Indeed, they do not 
content themselves with an internally consistent chain of derivations; 
they try to promote their position against their opponents by relying 
on the actual understanding of their interlocutors, thus taking the 
explicitly denied primacy of actuality as an implicit basic premise.  
To summarize, actuality should not intervene in the discourse of 
either its supporters or its opponents, lest they accept to be caught into 
inextricable performative contradictions. Its opponents should content 
themselves with pursuing their regulative ideal of ever-increasingly 
comprehensive models tending to close the epistemic circle. And its 
supporters should content themselves with displaying the lacunae 
which are left in one’s description of the world by the successive 
realizations of the regulative ideal of the opponents (paragraphs 2 and 
3 of this article illustrate this latter attitude). Talking of actuality can 
nevertheless become indispensible, as an auxiliary trick, whenever the 
upholders of the mechanist-formalist trend of thought become so 
fascinated by the faster and faster run in the direction indicated by 
their regulative ideal that they become deaf to the remarks of those 
who display the recurring lacunae. This is why I decided to give 
“actuality” such a prominent role in this article, though I was not 
unaware of the insuperable (and well-known) difficulties this would 
raise. 
As I said formerly, giving priority to the formal model over 
actuality does not have only the “Golem complex” among its 
consequences; it also has another consequence that I described as 
major. This consequence is that it promotes and keeps very efficiently 
alive what Kant called “the transcendental illusion”. But what is 
exactly the transcendental illusion?  It consists in reifying the ideally 
completed aim of a rational investigation, so that one views it as an 
adequate representation of some absolute reality. For theoretical 
enquirers, it consists in taking at ontological face value every formal 
element which provides them with a precise orientation in the 
attainment of knowledge. In other words, the transcendental illusion is 
a natural tendency to forget that the reason why one is committed to 
formal regulative ideals of research is essentially practical, and 
accordingly to interpret the corresponding forms as retaining 
something of the nature of the independently real. Along with such a 
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perspective, it appears that even though modern science has grown out 
of a radical criticism of scholastic and aristotelician ontology 
(especially the ontology of natural place)52, in fine it has promoted this 
kind of forgetfulness more powerfully than ever. This is the case 
because of the very success of the scientific method. Indeed, in its 
highest achievements, it manages to incorporate all the normative 
aspects of a class of efficient experimental practices within a formal 
model. So much so that the model itself tends to be hypostasized, to 
the detriment of a lucid recognition of the practical component in it. 
No wonder that the discourse of so many scientists of our time is 
flatly pre-critical in Kant’s sense: as Kant himself before the Critique 
of pure reason, they take for granted that actual perceptions or 
experimental outcomes represent things as they appear, whereas the 
theories and formalized models elaborated by our intelligence tend 
asymptotically to represent things as they are53. 
A very serious question must be raised at this point. Kant explained 
at length that, according to him, even if it is disclosed, the 
transcendental illusion is persistent and unavoidable54. This assertion 
is best justified by the commitment of any practice to its internally 
presupposed target. A transcendental illusion is likely to arise 
imperatively from within the practice whose interests are embodied by 
it.  The man-in-the-street is committed to the targets of his action and 
discourse, and this commitment gives rise to what A. Fine named the 
Natural Ontological Attitude. As for the scientist, he/she is committed 
to the targets of his/her experimental practice, as well as to the 
heuristic guides of this practice. Extrapolating the Natural Ontological 
Attitude to the objects and models of science is then the normal 
expression of the seriousness with which the scientist undertakes the 
research at stake55. As a consequence, many philosophers of science 
consider that, as Putnam56 would have it, “science taken at face value 
implies realism”, or that “realism is so to speak science’s philosophy 
of science”.  
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But then, by taking the exact counterpart of this internal 
committment of scientists, namely by adopting an external view on 
science, we can also imagine a very different situation. Provided one 
stands back from the practices which generate a favourite 
intentionally aimed at picture of the world, one may have an 
opportunity to see the loopholes of this picture (and thus to be freed of 
the transcendental illusion associated with it). In order to submit 
Kant’s view that the transcendental illusion is unavoidable to a 
moderate criticism, I shall therefore proceed in two steps. To begin 
with, I shall briefly evoke the loopholes of the current pictures of the 
world from a viewpoint poorly defined as ‘that of somebody who has 
decided to step back from the practices associated to the pictures of 
the man-in-the-street and of the scientist’. Later on, in paragraph 5, I 
shall give some precisions about the various ways of stepping back, 
and about the various depths of the move. 
Typically, the loophole left in the above-mentioned pictures of the 
world can be described as follows: exclusive interest for what Thomas 
Nagel calls ‘The view from nowhere’, and complete inability to 
account for any ‘view from somewhere’ aspect of ‘all that is the case’. 
An old example of this, in the moral science, is the inability of 
scientists to find an agreement between the so-called “freedom of the 
will” and a deterministic picture of the world, and also their tendency 
to think (incorrectly57) that the solution of this riddle is to be found in 
some indeterministic features of the natural processes. Such a disarray 
is not surprising if, as L.W. Beck58 points out, the scientific 
description comes about within a disengaged view from nowhere, 
whereas freedom is the necessary presupposition of any actor engaged 
somewhere. The major mistake here amounts to trying desperately to 
fit what pertains to the standpoint of the actually engaged actor into a 
disengaged and timeless picture.  
Another example is the extreme reluctance of specialists, especially 
during the first half of the 20th century, to recognize contextual 
aspects in semantics or in the physical science. Nowadays, 
contextuality has virtually pervaded every field of knowledge, but 
there are also enduring symptoms that some consequences of it have 
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not been fully accepted. Indeed, the predominant tendency is to look 
for a way of encompassing the low-order contexts within the field of a 
higher-order non-contextual discourse or description. But such a 
regress from a lower level of contextual description to an meta-level 
of non-contextual characterization of the contexts must have an end. 
Part of the contexts must be left in the background (see the case of 
quantum mechanics). Absence of recognition of this necessity has had 
unfortunate consequences in philosophy.  
One of these consequences is the poor analysis provided by 
philosophers of language about the indexical components of everyday 
speech. According to the current view, indexical terms such as here, 
now, I, this, etc., are all to be considered as token-reflexive devices. 
‘Here’ is supposed to be used to refer to the place from which it is 
uttered; ‘now’ to the time of utterance; ‘I’ to the person who utters it, 
and ‘this’ to the item pointed towards by the person who utters it. But 
this simple token-reflexive analysis leaves aside a very important 
aspect of the use of indexical terms. That this is so is especially 
obvious for ‘now’ and for ‘I’. One of the most striking components of 
the meaning of ‘Now’ is what we could call its self-elusiveness: 
namely the fact (already pointed out by Hegel in the introductory 
sentence of this paper) that as soon as Now is taken as an object of 
awareness, it is no longer now. Similarly, it was recently emphasized59 
that, in performative sentences, ‘I’ does much more than merely 
referring to the person who utters it. It conveys personal commitment. 
In other words, it is clear that ‘I’ has not only the function a pronoun; 
for replacing it by a noun, say in a promise, often fail to convey the 
same meaning. 
It is not so difficult to overcome these difficulties provided one 
makes a clear distinction between the presuppositive and the 
denotative function of an indexical. The denotative function of 
indexicals enable them to partake of the expression of a formalizable 
‘view from nowhere’; but their presuppositive function is definitely 
irreducible to this view, and it indirectly points towards the too 
obvious and hence forgotten actuality. In the case of ‘now’, one 
should for instance establish a pragmatic distinction between the 
presupposed presence and the denoted instants. In the case of ‘I’, the 
model for a distinction between the presupposed and the denoted is 
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already available in G.H. Mead's work about the difference between 
‘I’ and ‘me’, and in recent commentaries on G.H. Mead by J. 
Habermas60. True, Mead61 starts his analysis by endorsing the 
traditional opposition between the transcendental and the empirical, 
when he writes: “The ‘I’ is the transcendental self of Kant. The self-
conscious, actual self in social intercourse is the objective ‘me’ (...)”. 
But he then clearly promotes the pragmatic way of thinking when he 
points out that, during a conversation, “(...) ‘I’ is a presupposition, but 
never a presentation of conscious experience”, whereas the objective 
‘me’ can be presented.  
It is interesting to notice at this point that there is an obvious 
twofold parallel: 
(i) between ‘I’ and the actual now, and 
(ii) between ‘me’ and the referred to instant of vocal utterance of 
the sound ‘now’. 
Making full use of this parallel would lead to the following 
paraphrase of Mead’s statement about ‘I’: The real Now is a 
presupposition of speech, even though it cannot be spoken about. The 
token-reflexive ‘now’ can be spoken about, but it does not deserve to 
be called “Now”.  
That this is more than a mere analogy can be guessed from the 
detailed temporal analysis of ‘I’ and ‘me’ as given by Mead and 
Habermas. According to these authors, ‘I’ can but be given to me by 
means of memory; ‘I’ is always a historical figure, if it is to be a 
figure at all; the ‘I’ is either what you were one second ago, or it 
completely eludes thematization. Similarly, ‘now’ either receives ex 
post facto characterization or it eludes any characterization. Such an 
overlapping irresistibly suggests the idea of a common origin of the 
plurality of particular indexical terms such as ‘now’ and ‘I’. It  makes 
likely that they have all been derived, in some remote (and possibly 
mythical) prehistory of language, from a single general indexical term 
“Aha!”, that may be said to stem from “absolute actuality” (in 
phenomenological terms) or from “act force”62 (in pragmatic terms). 
Whereas each particular indexical (I, here, now, this) presupposes 
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only a particular aspect of the context of speech, the general indexical 
“Aha!” would presuppose the whole actual context. 
 This primeval all-encompassing indexical would have some 
affinities with the “inarticulate sound” with which, says 
Wittgenstein63, some philosophers would like to start their 
investigation. Wittgenstein is perfectly right to emphasize that this 
inarticulate sound cannot really be taken as the explicit departure 
point of philosophy, because “(...) one cannot begin before the 
beginning”. But I also think that the all-pervasive implicit role of what 
is expressed by this sound should underpin each single word of the 
work of a philosopher, if he is to avoid improprieties and dissonances 
with respect to what it is like to be a sentient being. 
 
5-Three remedies against the transcendental illusion 
 
Freeing oneself from the transcendental illusion would mean being 
able to broaden one’s awareness so as to encompass the whole of 
actuality (including the immanently operating regulative ideals), 
rather than letting oneself be carried away by exclusive fascination for 
the interest-relative objects of thought construed as transcendent. As I 
mentioned previously, the preliminary condition for this liberation 
consists in stepping back from the practice whose orientations are 
embodied by a set of objects of thought. But of course, such a move is 
not easy to perform. The more one gets close to the basic practices of 
life, and the more it becomes difficult. In view of this difficulty, I 
shall adopt a progressive approach. I shall discuss successively three 
strategies aiming at freeing oneself from deeper and deeper layers of 
the transcendental illusion. The first strategy pertains to (Kant’s) 
critical philosophy; the second stragegy to Wittgensteinian ‘therapy’; 
and the third strategy to Indian (Hinduist and Buddhist) soteriology64.  
The standpoint of critical philosophy has been adopted repeatedly 
in this paper; and the very concept of a transcendental illusion has 
been borrowed from it. That it consists in stepping back from the main 
scientific practices can easily be appreciated from the two-sidedness 
of Kant’s discussion on the implications of transcendental philosophy 
for scientists. On the one hand, in the Transcendental aesthetic 
section of his Critique of pure reason Kant states that space is not a 
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concept abstracted from our outer experiences, but rather the a priori 
form of all outer intuitions. It is only this way that one can understand 
how it is possible to have a knowledge of the necessary propositions 
of geometry. But on the other hand, in paragraph 13 of his 
Prolegomena, Kant also accepts that, with respect to any possible 
experience and to any possible geometrical practice, everything 
remains exactly as if (“als ob”) space were an intrinsic feature of 
things and of their relations. The critical attitude thus stems from the 
meta-standpoint of the philosopher, and it proves mostly irrelevant 
from the ordinary standpoint of the man-in-the-street or the scientist 
who are immersed into their more or less sophisticated practices. 
But once one has stepped back from the ordinary standpoint of 
practitioners, once one has adopted the philosopher’s meta-standpoint 
in Kant’s sense, some consequences become unavoidable. One crucial 
consequence is complete disconnection between objectivity and 
ontological reality, between the intentional objects and the putative 
‘thing-in-itself’. This distinction is usually found very difficult to 
understand by scientists. Indeed, most of them take for granted that 
framing objective entities is tantamount to grasping reality; they 
accept without discussion that the striving for invariance is at the 
same time a striving towards reality in the absolute; they cannot figure 
out that universally valid relations, as expressed by a formalism, do 
not tend unavoidably to be identical with (ontologically) real 
relations. Their main argument is that, by definition, the sought 
absolute reality has to be independent of any particular perspective 
and of any special mode of experimental investigation. Therefore, 
they say, increasing the range of perspectives and modes of 
experimental investigations with respect to which our formal models 
are independent, can but bring us nearer and nearer from reality in the 
absolute. But this reasoning is manifestly flawed. First, the fact that 
invariance with respect to any generalized standpoint is a necessary 
condition for defining “absolute reality” does not entail that it is a 
sufficient condition. The absoluteness of this reality has invariance as 
a consequence, but the converse has yet to be proved. Second, there is 
a gap between defining a concept of “absolute reality” in abstracto 
and trying to characterize it. This is so because the very acceptance of 
the definition of an “absolute reality” makes the project of finding out 
its determinations self-defeating. Indeed, if this definition is taken at 
face value, the project has to assume that it makes sense to seek what 
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is reality independently of any activity of seeking; or to characterize 
reality relative to no procedure of characterization at all65. 
Characterizing something, even in such a way that part of the 
characterization becomes invariant with respect to contexts and 
perspectives, involves two steps, not one. It involves one step of 
defining determinations relative to a large (but not arbitrary) class of 
contexts, and then another step of abductive66 extraction of a stable 
element among these determinations. Asserting that this invariant 
tends to represent something of an “absolute reality” disconnected 
from any contextual background, is only possible if one has forgotten 
the initial step of the procedure by means of which the invariant was 
extracted. In order to avoid this inaccuracy, one should not lose sight 
of the fact that the kind of universality and invariance science is able 
to reach only holds for a wide class of perspectives, of methodological 
approaches, and of interests within the world; it does not hold for 
some utopic “nowhere” having nothing to do with perspectives, 
situations, methods and interests. As F. Klein would have it, every 
invariant must be referred to its group of symmetry; it is only the 
invariant of this group. Here again, objectivity implies independence 
with respect to situations belonging to a certain comprehensive class; 
it does not imply absolute lack of relevance of the concept of 
situation. 
The most obvious reason why many scientists (and also 
philosophers of the analytic tradition) are so prone to forget it, is that 
they just happen to be immersed in these situations, to adopt these 
approaches, and to share these interests. But there is also another, 
more subtle, reason for this forgetfulness. It is the philosophical 
circumstance that if the emergence of invariants of a wider and wider 
class of modes of investigation is not to be ascribed to some 
convergence towards some pre-structured independent reality, then 
one usually does not know how to explain it67. This kind of remark 
can be found, for instance, in B. Williams’ Ethics and the limits of 
philosophy: “In a scientific inquiry there should ideally be 
convergence on an answer, where the best explanation of the 
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convergence involves the idea that the answer represents how things 
are”68. The problem is that the strong version of this belief, according 
to which realism “(...) is the only philosophy that does not make the 
success of science a miracle”69, might well arise from the same family 
of prejudices as that of somebody who identifies himself so strongly 
to a certain set of perspectives (here a familiar set of foundational 
perspectives) that he loses sight of the fact that they are nevertheless 
only perspectives. Here, freeing oneself from the prejudice would 
mean remaining open to a variety of interpretations of the evolution 
and of the success of scientific theories. After all, the so-called 
“convergent realism” is not necessarily the best, and by no means the 
only, explanation of the growing generality and success of the 
invariants of scientific investigation. On the one hand the soundness 
of this explanation has recently been challenged with a series of 
strong arguments coming from the neo-rationalist and the neo-
empiricist philosophies of sciences as well70; and on the other hand 
alternative explanations are not out of reach. Among these 
alternatives, let me emphasize the pragmatic-transcendental 
explanation of the success of quantum mechanics I have myself 
suggested71. It consists in showing that it is perfectly possible to 
regard the Hilbert-space structure of quantum mechanics, and the 
general form of its equations of evolution, as an embodiment of the 
necessary pre-conditions of a wide class of activities of seeking and 
predicting. This being granted, the quantum theory no longer appears 
as a reflection of some (exhaustive or non-exhaustive) aspect of a pre-
given nature, but as the structural expression of the co-emergence of a 
new type of experimental activity and of the ‘factual’ elements which 
constrain it. Nothing then prevents one from extending tentatively the 
latter conclusion to other branches of physics, and to cognitive 
activities in general72. This would involve recognition that the major 
invariants of scientific theories are neither to be taken as a direct 
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expression of some independent reality, nor as the mere projection of 
the structure of our thought, but as a formal expression of the 
conditions for the co-stabilization of a class of objects and its (bodily 
or instrumental) modes of investigation. In terms borrowed from F. 
Varela et al., “cognition in its broadest acceptation consists of 
enaction, that is to say making a world emerge through a viable 
history of structural coupling”73. 
In view of this alternative orientation of the philosophy of science, 
there is no reason left to give any metaphysical priority to form over 
actuality, or to invariants over the flux of appearances, beyond the 
epistemological priority it understantably has for scientists.  
I am aware that it sounds paradoxical to advocate renouncement to 
any attempt at catching some absolute reality beyond phenomena by 
invoking Kant’s dissociation between ontological reality and 
objectivity. After all, the elementary concept of a ‘thing-in-itself’ 
underpinning the immanent appearances is likely to stimulate, rather 
than to inhibit, the project of looking for something immutable and 
true below the changing and sometimes deceptive actuality. This is so 
because the dualism of phenomenon and thing-in-itself unavoidably 
generates a representation of transcendence. 
But one should not forget that the concept of ‘thing-in-itself’ has 
undergone a momentous evolution in the work of Kant, and then in 
the analysis of the successive generations of neo-Kantian 
philosophers. The key-process of this evolution was that of a 
progressive merging of the ‘thing-in-itself’ into the flux of 
immanence. According to L. Ferry, for instance, “The thing-in-itself 
should no longer be construed as a cause of the representations, but as 
the very fact of representation ”74. Along with this move, the concept 
of ‘thing-in-itself’ has completely lost the power of suggesting that 
there is something out there which causes the appearances, and that 
scientists tend to grasp it asymptotically by identifying more and more 
comprehensive formal invariants. Accordingly, reality is no longer 
construed as something very deep, very abstract, very general, far 
beyond the narrowly located actualities, but as essentially akin to 
actuality in general.  
It is interesting to notice that this immanent conception of reality, 
which was advocated long ago by neo-kantian or pragmatist 
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philosophers, is also pervading the views of some contemporary 
realist and materialist philosophers. T. Nagel, who defines his own 
position as a variety of realism, emphasized repeatedly that objectivity 
and invariance do not exhaust reality: “The way the world is includes 
(local) appearances, and there is no single point of view from which 
they can all be fully grasped”75. As for M. Lockwood, who presented 
an interesting materialist view of mental processes in his Mind, brain 
and the quantum, he insisted that objective knowledge of the brain 
events by means of perception and elaboration of formal models is 
only one possible way of access to these events. Another way in 
which the same events might be known is “(...) self-awareness: 
knowing certain brain events (...) ‘from the inside’, by living them, or 
one might almost say, by self-reflectively being them”76. The actual 
complex of experienced qualia, of perceptive identification, and of 
intentional directedness, precisely represents this kind of 
apprehension of reality from within, according to M. Lockwood. If 
one makes an exception of the inaccuracy which consists in conflating 
the internal and external standpoints, namely asserting that one has 
knowledge ‘from the inside’ of a series of events (the brain events) 
which were initially defined relative to the external mode of access, 
this remark contains an important insight. It consists in pointing out 
that actuality is not to be considered, dualistically, as a pure local 
appearance-for-us of some transcendent reality which formal models 
tend to describe. Actuality should rather be thought of, non-
dualistically, as an admittedly bound and partial mode of the 
immanent reality self-reflectively being itself. 
As I mentioned previously, the second strategy tending to 
undermine the transcendental illusion is Wittgenstein’s “therapy”. As 
Wittgenstein writes, “The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like 
treatment of an illness”77. Now, the etiology of this illness is not very 
difficult to elucidate: it is the powerful spell of language. As a 
consequence, “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language”78. The Wittgensteinian therapy is 
then primarily directed against the philosophical disease which 
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consists in reifying the presuppositions of everyday life and speech, 
and elaborating a metaphysics out of this. Accordingly, the job of a 
Wittgensteinian philosopher consists in undoing the complex 
metaphysical architectures inherited from past philosophy, and 
pointing out its roots in the use of language.  Each possible locus of 
bewitchment by language has to be explored in turn. A reasonable list 
includes the use of substantives, predicates, and (grammatical or 
mathematical) rules.  
To begin with, one of the greatest source of “philosophical 
bewilderment” is that “a substantive makes us look for a thing which 
correspond to it”79. Substantives like ‘meaning’ or ‘truth’ seem to 
force us to point to something, and our incapacity to do so produces a 
“mental cramp”. It is only if one transforms the question of 
correspondance into a question of use, that the mental cramp is cured 
at its source. Wittgenstein’s criticism of our fascination for 
substantives also extends to what one might call the urge for 
Substances, namely for a metaphysical ground of the division of ‘all 
that is the case’ into individualized intrinsically existent objects. 
Firstly, we have no need of such a ground: “Children do not learn that 
books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. - they learn to fetch books, sit in 
armchairs, etc.”80. Secondly, attempting to identify a metaphysical 
ground unavoidably generates sceptical reactions which are almost 
impossible to overcome by arguments. Our certainties do not arise 
from any firm ontological knowledge; they only express the interplay 
of our linguistic and gestural practices. “My life shews that I know or 
am certain that there is a chair over there”81. “The end (...) is an 
ungrounded way of acting”82. One teaching quantum physicists should 
draw from this analysis of certainties concerns the emergence of a 
macroscopic quasi-classical world from the so-called quantum world. 
Instead of trying desperately to make the macro-world come out of the 
internal functioning of the Hilbert space model construed as a 
reasonably faithful description of reality, they should realize that this 
macro-world partakes of the ungrounded knowing-how of 
experimenters; and that their tentative theoretical knowing-that being 
based on this initial knowing-how, it can pride itself on no logical or 
                                         
79 L. Wittgenstein, The blue and brown books, Blackwell, 1969, p. 1 
80 L. Wittgenstein, On certainty, Blackwell, 1974, §476 
81 ibid. §7 
82 L. Wittgenstein, On certainty, op. cit. §110 
 35 
metaphysical priority whatsoever. My reading of the decoherence 
theories in paragraph 3 was in good agreement with this anti-
foundationalist stance. It said that decoherence does not show that the 
appearance of a classical world can literally be grounded on a real 
quantum world. Decoherence only displays the possibility of a 
reasonable quantitative agreement between the initial knowing-how of 
the quantum physicist and his/her theoretical end-product; it is part of 
a demonstration that the overall epistemic process can be made self-
consistent, in spite of its being ungrounded. A metaphor used by 
Wittgenstein nicely expresses this substitution of a feed-back loop for 
the traditional foundationalist stratified scheme:  “(...) one might 
almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole 
house”83.  
Another aspect of the philosophical illness to be cured is 
fascination with concepts. Concepts seem to require rigid limits, and 
therefore possibility to locate unambiguously an object on one side or 
the other of the limit. This is a prerequisite for the extensional 
definition of concepts, and this appears to be indispensible if one is to 
grasp a true ‘natural kind’ by means of a concept. But, says 
Wittgenstein, the situation in which we may define the strict limits of 
our concepts is exceptional. The ideal of such a situation has a purely 
regulative function, and the meta-concept of ‘natural kind’ is to be 
construed as a way of hypostasizing this ideal. The usual case is that 
of a fuzzy definition of the domain covered by a concept, by means of 
some ‘family resemblance’84. Of course, one could argue against 
Wittgenstein that ‘family resemblance’ is only useful in everyday 
language, and that science has nothing to do with it because it 
provides strict definition of its concepts. But even here, things are not 
so clear-cut. Enactment of a concept, i.e. making use of it, in actual 
experimental science as in actual life, supposes a sufficient plasticity 
of its form. An interesting example is provided by modern physics, 
whose persistent talk of “particles” has only been made possible by a 
remarkable capacity of extending the range of this concept well 
beyond what would have been acceptable in the context of classical 
science, and by acceptance of a certain amount of extensibility of its 
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limits. “Particle” is what H. Putnam85 would call a “broad spectrum 
notion”. 
The third and last element of the philosophical disease in 
Wittgenstein’s sense, is the belief that, when we perform an ordered 
activity, we follow an inner rail called a ‘rule’. But this way of putting 
things is misleading. For saying that somebody’s actions are in 
accordance to a rule is not tantamount to saying that the person is 
explicitly guided by the rule. According to S. Kripke’s reading86 of 
Wittgenstein’s analysis of the process of rule-following, one should 
then completely revert the priorities between the rules and the forms 
of life. In the same way as, in Hume’s analysis of causation, one 
should not say that regularities manifest underlying causal powers, but 
rather that speaking of causal powers is a way of integrating the 
regularity within one’s discourse, in Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule-
following, one should not say that regular behaviour manifests a real 
‘internal rail’ called a rule, but rather that speaking of rule-following 
is a way of integrating the regular behaviour (and its more or less 
explicit normative ideal) within one’s language game87. Such a 
reversal of priorities, if extended to science, has momentous 
consequences. It means renouncing the logical priority usually given 
to laws or to symmetries over the delegates of actuality called 
‘measurement outcomes’. And it pushes one to consider that these 
laws, or the propensities associated to these symmetries, are only a 
way of integrating the (deterministic or statistical, certified or 
expected) regularities of measurement outcomes within the project 
one ascribes to the experimental game of seeking and finding. This is 
the general version of the “Copernican revolution” of science which 
has already been documented in some readings of statistical physics 
and quantum mechanics (see §2 and §3 of this paper). 
Finally, I must sketch briefly the third and most radical strategy 
tending to undermine the transcendental illusion. This strategy is that 
of the soteriological discourse of Indian thought. It goes beyond mere 
criticism of the hypostasis of both the heuristic principles of science 
and the regulative ideals of metaphysics; it goes beyond the therapy of 
the ‘mental cramps’ of those philosophers who look for substances 
underlying the substantives; it does not content itself with a 
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philosophical cure of the philosophical temptation to reify the tacit 
guiding principles of everyday life and speech. It aims at drying up 
the very source of these wanderings, by moving to a level of 
awareness where the basic presuppositions which underly our action, 
our discourse, and even the way we see things, do not operate any 
longer. After all, one should not forget that endowing the regulative 
ideals of human investigations with a metaphysical significance, is a 
tendency which has its roots deep into the natural ontological attitude 
of the man-in-the-street. Whereas Kant and Wittgenstein only aimed 
at denouncing the philosophical consequences of the reification of 
substantives and theoretical entities used respectively in philosophical 
extrapolations and in scientific extrapolations of everyday speech, 
Indian soteriology had (and still has) the project of unrooting the 
natural ontological attitude of everyday life itself, by carefully 
identifying and defusing its existential motivations. 
Before we examine the way this project is carried out, we have to 
direct our attention towards two aspects of the opposition between 
form and actuality which have been overlooked until now; two 
aspects which are really crucial if we are to understand the alien 
attitude of the Indian civilization with regard to form. The first aspect 
is the connection of form with the future. And the second aspect is 
what we could refer to as the entanglement of form and actuality. 
At first sight, actuality is restricted to the present whereas formal 
models allow one to master the future by means of their predictive 
contents. But things are not so simple; these two judgments have to be 
qualified in turn. 
On the one hand, pure actuality is not averse to an internal 
orientation, called intentionality, towards the future (see below for 
more details); yet this latent future of intentionality is likely to be 
more open  than the enlisted future of predictive formalisms. 
On the other hand, as N. Goodman emphasized88, any formalized 
projective attempt is bound to have a basis in the present and the past. 
However, this basis is not necessarily restricted to present and past 
facts, as it would be the case in mere induction. According to 
Goodman, it rather extends to current and past successful predictions. 
A new projective hypothesis or formalism is not adopted if it only 
agrees with a finite set of past facts: it is accepted if it is more 
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comprehensive than past hypothesis, and if it does not contradict the 
most entranched elements of the previous overall projective network. 
In other terms, a new projective formalism does not depend 
anecdotally on the past, but it depends holistically on it. A good 
illustration of this situation in physics is the way new theories take 
previous theories as their limiting case in a restricted domain of 
validity. It thus becomes clear that the relation between predictive 
formalisms and the future is quite ambivalent. They allow a 
reasonably reliable projection into the future, but they also tend 
surreptitiously to present the future as a more or less complete 
continuation of the past. Their very ideal of mastery of nature implies 
the belief that, some day, a ‘Theory of everything’ will enable us to 
behave with respect to the future with the same confidence and the 
same feeling of closure as with respect to the past89. The only two 
circumstances that leave this project in suspense is (i) the current 
incompleteness of physical theories, which leaves room for further 
scientific revolutions, and (ii) the element of irreducible 
indeterminism incorporated in these theories.  
Let us now come to the problem of the entanglement between form 
and actuality. This issue is all the more important since it may 
retrospectively cast a doubt on the clearcut distinction we have 
accepted until now. At this point, we must take into account the 
thorough criticism which has been directed by the psychology and the 
philosophy of the twentieth century against the traditional Kantian 
divide between the pure ‘matter’ of sensation and the forms (of 
intuition and of thought). According to the Gestalt psychologists, to 
begin with, a perception does not split up into a purely passive 
sensorial input and an intellectual activity of interpretation;  it so to 
speak carries its interpretation with it. There is not on the one side a 
pure present actuality devoid of any predictive element, and on the 
other side an intellectual projective form which takes the aspect of an 
explicitly stated set of hypothesis. Rather, as J. Bouveresse notices, 
“perception is the hypothesis”90. Perception incorporates tacit rules of 
anticipations which can be formalized retrospectively.  
                                         
89 See C. Schmitz, “Objectivité et temporalité”, in: M. Bitbol & S. Laugier, (eds.), Physique et 
réalité, un débat avec Bernard d’Espagnat, op. cit. 
90 J. Bouveresse, Langage, perception et réalité, Tome 1, Perception et jugement, Jacqueline 
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This point was repeatedly insisted upon by the phenomenological 
tradition. Husserl’s analysis of what remains after the ‘bracketing’ of 
the natural attitude has taken place, involves what he calls a ‘noema’. 
This ‘noema’ may be construed as a stable form which persists from 
one appearance to another, which incorporates an immanently 
intentional aspect in it, and which therefore operates as a 
generalization of the notion of meaning91. Now, despite its formal 
components, the noema is not separable from the whole act of 
perception. As Husserl explained, perception can be taken as a low-
level epistemic operation, or an implicit judgment92, even though the 
epistemic operations and judgements proper can only arise after a 
certain amount of elaboration of the ante-predicative layer of 
perception has taken place.  
Later on, M. Merleau-Ponty amplified the anti-intellectualist stance 
of phenomenology. He especially emphasized that, unlike Kantian 
philosophy (especially in its neo-kantian reading), phenomenology 
deals with a formal and intentional component of perception which 
cannot be reduced to any operation of the understanding. According 
to Merleau-Ponty, “Each part (of experience) foretells more than its 
contents, and therefore this elementary perception is already loaded 
with meaning”93. Perception goes beyond the stage of a mere flux of 
sensations even before the intervention of the categorical forms of 
thought. 
Wittgenstein himself undertook a remarkable ‘grammatical’ (and 
sometimes phenomenological) analysis of the formal aspect of actual 
perceptions, which he named ‘seeing as’. The examples he gave range 
from the ‘duck-rabbit’ to the Necker cube. The drawing of a ‘duck-
rabbit’ can (obviously) be perceived either as a duck or as a rabbit. As 
for the cube, it can be perceived under two three-dimensional 
orientations, which are equally compatible with the two-dimensional 
image on the paper; it can also be seen as the representation of many 
distinct objects. The key point of Wittgenstein’s reflection is the 
major difference between seeing and interpreting. Even though we 
really see a certain illustration under one or another form, “(...) it is 
remarkable that we can equally use the term interpretation for 
                                         
91 H.L. Dreyfus, Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science, MIT Press, 1982 
92 E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Glaassen & Goverts, 1954, p. 62 
93 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenoménologie de la perception, Gallimard, 1945, p. 9 
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describing what is immediately perceived!”94. We actually see 
something as such and such object, but, after careful retrospective 
analysis, we can also conceive this view as loaded with interpretation. 
Just in the same way as the fact that somebody’s reliable behaviour 
can retrospectively be considered as a sign that this person is 
explicitly guided by a rule. 
In view of this pre-verbal entanglement of actuality and form, as 
well as of present perceptions and intentionally aimed at future, the 
task of somebody who would like to defuse the natural ontological 
attitude appears very difficult, not to say hopeless. At any rate, 
disentanglement should involve an attempt at working below the level 
of verbal reasoning and argument. Now, this move from the verbal to 
the pre-verbal is exactly what most Indian philosophies would 
recommend. The universal method they use for that, to wit the Yoga95, 
is several thousands years old. The yoga has some western analogs, 
ranging from psychological introspection to phenomenological 
reduction, not to mention mystical contemplation. But this very 
multiplicity of equivalents shows that no such analogy is perfect96. For 
instance, the yoga differs radically from its much criticized western 
counterpart (introspection), in so far as it is intrinsically non-dualistic. 
However, it has more interesting connections with phenomenological 
reduction (or ‘bracketing’). Indeed, in phenomenological reduction, as 
in yoga, “(...) the only reason why [one] should bracket the belief in 
the existence of the world is to see it (...)”97. In phenomenological 
reduction, as in yoga, “(...) [one] must sink into the world instead of 
dominating it”98. But there are also two major differences between the 
yoga and the phenomenological reduction, bearing on their maturity 
and on their function. Firstly, the yoga has been much more carefully 
codified than the phenomenological reduction during its long life-
span, and this allowed systematic teaching. Secondly, whereas the 
function of phenomenological reduction is primarily epistemic, yoga’s 
is soteriological: it aims at freeing man from his/her worldly bondage. 
                                         
94 L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie, B. Blackwell, 1980, §9 
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Now, the fact that the methods recommended to disentangle form, 
intention, and actuality, have to be non-verbal while they are used, 
does not prevent one from expressing their essential features in 
retrospect. One must only remember that this expression does not 
provide a faithful description of what is at stake (this would be self-
contradictory), but only a guide intended for other practioners. The 
Indian soteriologists as well as the western phenomenologists have 
made several attempts in this direction. A most remarkable point 
about these attempts is that Indian practioners of yoga and 
phenomenologists are in reasonable agreement with one another; and 
that moreover their views are both compatible, on the experiential 
side, with the objectifying descriptions of some specialists of 
cognitive science99.  
Let us begin with practitioners of yoga (for, after all, they have a 
historical priority). According to them, our bondage, to wit our being 
compelled to adopt the natural ontological attitude whereby we see 
things dualistically, (essentially) comes from desire, action, and 
grasping. Desire is motivated by our relating every appearance to our 
egocentric needs. Action arises from an understandable attempt at 
appeasing the desire. And grasping is the consequence of one’s hope 
that it is possible to freeze the situation wherein the needs are satisfied 
(and the threats avoided). Accordingly, the yoga tends to dissolve the 
ego, to liberate the action from craving, and to release the urge of 
grasping: 
(i) Promoting the immediate awareness of the cosmic unity (the 
‘That art thou [Tat tvam asi]’ of the Upanishads100) is obviously a 
radical way of dissolving the individual ego.  
(ii) The perfect immobility of the yoga practitioner is a first (though 
extrinsic and superficial) approach towards the solution of the 
problem of action. As Nâgârjuna writes, “The root of cyclic existence 
is action, Therefore the wise one does not act”101. However, the latter 
sentence is best understood not in the sense of complete and definitive 
withdrawal from active life, but in the sense of an attempt at freeing 
the acts from the chain of conditions. This idea is remarkably 
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conveyed by M. Eliade: “the yoga recommends to live, but not to 
remain the instrument of life”102. 
(iii) Finally, since grasping is part of an attempt at casting out the 
effect of time, it has to be counterbalanced by a meditation on 
impermanence. This does not mean that a yogi (or yogini) does not 
care for the future; but he/she equanimously considers each present 
act as a seed which may or may not sprout, rather than as part of a 
heroic attempt at dominating time by reaching the immutable form of 
nature. 
Once this process is completed, one reaches “The pacification of all 
objectification and the pacification of illusion (...)”103. The world is no 
longer seen as a collection of individual substances corresponding to 
the lexical substantives; rather, one “(...) see(s) things as they are - as 
merely (...) dependent, impermanent and non-substantial (...)”104. 
Unlike Kant, Indian (especially Buddhist) thinkers thus consider that 
the transcendental illusion can be overcome, and they give detailed 
and coherent instructions for that105. 
Further information about this process of emancipation from the 
very source of every metaphysical wandering can be found in 
contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. They also concern 
the three points which have already been documented, namely 
egocentration, action, and time.  
To begin with, M. Merleau-Ponty repeatedly criticized the 
subjectivist tendency of transcendental philosophy. According to him, 
if I am to overcome the transcencental illusion, “(...) if I am to be ek-
statically within the world and the things”, then “nothing must retain 
me far away from them (...) not even this (philosophical) description 
of myself as a ‘subject’, as a ‘mind’ or as an ‘ego’ (...) which 
reintroduces in me a ghost of reality and arouses the belief that I am a 
res cogitans (...)”106. I must no longer represent myself as some 
separate entity facing Being, for my view on Being arises from within 
the midst of it107. This is an indispensible preliminary step in order to 
recognize that things and minds are all “(...) differences or extreme 
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gaps of an unique something”108. And this obviously also prevents one 
from thinking that he/she can reach the position of a Kosmotheoros109, 
a pure abstract detached observer seeing things from nowhere. 
The second point is action. It is well accepted in contemporary 
philosophy that perception and intentionality cannot be separated 
from both the motivating forces of desire and the schemes of activity. 
In some early writings of Husserl’s, one finds that these issues are 
completely intermingled: “The interest is not at rest, it is not bound to 
the image; it struggles to escape from it. Therefore, there arises an 
intention, a tensed interest, which tends to confront the matter. If 
nothing happens next, we feel tensed, dissatisfied; if it happens, we 
feel satisfied”110. Intentionality, and the ‘noema’ which is the formal 
basis of it, thus clearly have a partly pragmatic background which 
Husserl expressed in phenomenological terms.  
This pragmatic background of the formal component of any 
perception  (the seeing-as) has been suggested even more insistently 
by Wittgenstein, even though he finally reverted to a purely 
‘grammatical’ analysis. As J. Bouveresse notices111, seeing a drawing 
as A or as B might well depend on a different ordering of the eye-
movements which come before recognition; it may also depend on the 
different activity schemes which are mobilized when something is 
perceived as one or as another possible objects of manipulation.  
To summarize, Husserl and Wittgenstein both recognized a 
pragmatic component of intentionality or seeing-as. But they also 
both rejected the temptation of naturalizing it; they rather gave it the 
transcendental position of a phenomenological or grammatical pre-
condition. This does not mean that the transcendentalist trend of 
thought dismisses any approach of the same issues by the methods of 
a natural science, but only that, if such an investigation were carried 
out, its outcomes should have to be related with the phenomenological 
/ grammatical analysis in terms of parallelism112 or supervenience, 
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rather than in terms of reductionism or materialist foundationalism. 
This precaution being taken, it is very interesting, even from a 
phenomenological or Wittgensteinian standpoint, to notice that 
cognitive sciences have also recognized the intermingling of 
perception and action. A classical experiment113 (commented by 
Varela et al.114) for instance shows that when kittens have been made 
completely passive, they lose the possibility of perceiving standard 
obstacles.  
Along with these remarks, it becomes clearer than ever that 
disentangling actual perceptions from its formal-intentional 
component, to wit allowing one to see rather than to see-as, 
presupposes either suspension of action or lucid identification of the 
motor schemes involved in perception as soon as they operate. This is 
the price which would have to be paid if our life-long commitment to 
the natural ontological attitude were to be alleviated. In the same way 
as one has to step back from a scientific practice and from its 
regulative ideals in order to overcome the special variety of 
transcendental illusion which is associated to it, one would have to 
step back from any practice, or at least from any commitment to 
practices, in order to overcome the ultimate source of transcendental 
illusion. That this is possible is usually accepted without difficulty in 
the East. Whether this is desirable or not in our Western context, is 
obviously an open question, but the mere possibility of such a radical 
move should modify thoroughly, in the long term, our basic 
epistemological attitudes. This is one of the most important aspects of 
the Renaissance of the Western outlook115, which could be prompted 
by our ever more insistant contact with the Eastern culture. 
Finally, there is the question of time. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, science as a whole can be construed as the most 
advanced attempt of mankind for mastering the productiveness of/in 
time. Defining stable objects is the usual first step of this process. The 
second step consists in identifying the law-like behaviour of the 
changes in these objects, for, as M. Schlick explained: “(...) the 
permanent in an alteration is called its law”116. As for the third step, it 
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is the project of elaborating an all-encompassing and hopefully 
immutable formalism (the ‘final’ theory ‘of everything’), which 
nevertheless accounts for every ‘apparently’ fluent aspect of all that is 
the case. This is our civilization’s most elaborate version of the urge 
to lock time up117. Of course, the attitude of scientists towards time is 
much more ambivalent than that in their everyday work. True, their 
project of formulating a theory of everything, as well as their attempts 
at encompassing every single transient feature of phenomena within 
the scope of their formalisms, manifests a neo-Parmenidean project. 
But as soon as a difficulty arises, implementation of the project is 
postponed until an indeterminate future. This openness of the 
scientific future might well be the way by which the blind spot of 





The purpose of the present paper was obviously not to prevent one 
from using the method of formalization in science, but rather to 
remind one repeatedly of its restricted function. This function is to 
elaborate a coherent, integrated, and universal system of projection (in 
Goodman’s sense) for any activity of exploration of our environment. 
Coherence is provided by the precise (deductive and abductive) rules 
to which the formalism is subjected; integration prevails as a 
regulative ideal; and universality (namely validity irrespective of 
location, time, and individual) arises from the tendency of formalisms 
towards symmetry and abstraction. As long as these statements are 
borne in mind, nobody can loose sight of the fact that actuality is an 
indispensible presupposition of formalization, not a by-product of the 
entities postulated by a theory associated to that formalism; that 
formalisms are elaborated to anticipate particular actualities as 
efficiently and as universally as possible, not to justify the existence or 
the characteristics of any given actuality. It is only when one looses 
trace of very process of abstraction which led to the formalism that it 
becomes tempting to ascribe to the formalism the impossible task of 
accounting in retrospect for the existence and characteristics of 
actuality.  
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These remarks provide us with a useful insight into what should be 
expected from a formal epistemology. Instead of adding one more step 
to the process of formalization, thus favouring the process of 
forgetfulness of the restricted function of formalisms, a formal 
epistemology should promote the clarification of the origin and 
purpose of presently available predictive formalisms in physics and in 
other sciences. This can easily be done if one accepts, as I did in my 
paper “Formal epistemology, logic and grammar”, that a formal 
epistemology is only meant to show or to manifest the coordinated 
structure of anticipation of physical theories, not to elaborate one 
more theory; exactly in the same way as logic and grammar are only 
meant to show or to manifest the tacit rules of use of (actual or 
possible) languages, not to add something to language. 
